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Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: Is Honesty Without
Accountability or Enforcement Still Enough?
Alisa Tschorke*
INTRODUCTION
"[Twenty-five] million people die each year from contaminated
water. That's the equivalent to the entire population of Canada,"' but
"[w]ithout water we would die within [three] days." 2 Therefore,
freshwater is extremely important to the world, especially as the
population continues to grow and water becomes increasingly polluted by
human activities. The Great Lakes is an ecosystem that lies on the
boundary between the United States and Canada, containing twenty
percent of the world's fresh water.3 As industry and urban areas developed
in the region, human pollution began to poison the Great Lakes.4 Since the
beginning of the 1950s, the Great Lakes have become familiar with
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Candidate, American University, Washington College of Law, 2009; B.A., Cornell
University, 2006. I would like to thank my parents for their support and encouragement.
I would also like to thank WCL Professor David Hunter and American University
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1 ANITA RODDICK, TROUBLED WATER: SAINTS, SINNERS, TRUTHS AND LIES ABOUT THE
GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 53 (Brooke Shelby Biggs ed., Anita Roddick Books 2004).
2 Id. at 14.
3 See Int'l Joint Comm'n [IJC], 13th Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality
(December 2006), at 5, available at http://www.ijc.org/en/publications/pdf/13emar6r.pdf
(last visited June 1, 2007) (hereinafter 13th Biennial Report) (stressing the importance of
the Great Lakes bodies of water themselves and the importance in maintaining a good
quality of water); Edith Brown Weiss, New Directions for the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement: A Commentary, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 375 (1989) (declaring the Great
Lakes the largest freshwater system in world).
4 See Sally Billups et al., Treading Water: A Review of Government Progress under the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (Part II): A Report to the International Joint
Commission, 1998 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L. SCI. & POL'Y 245, 269 (1998) (explaining
that urban development results in contaminated runoff and sewage system discharges).
The review speculated that Ontario's population would grow over twenty percent within
twenty years. Id.
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"bacteria-laden beaches, lakes choked with algae and fish contaminated by
industrial waste."5 Public outcry grew as threats to human health, drinking
water, and wildlife populations increased, forcing the governments to
address the issue of pollution.6 Starting in the 1970s, the governments of
the United States and Canada began working together to develop a
solution to the Great Lakes' many pollution issues.
Although pollution in the Great Lakes has decreased since the high
levels of the 1950s through the 1970s, substances, including toxic, human,
animal, and industrial wastes continue to pollute the Great Lakes. In the
near future, the governments need to address new and old problems. 9
5 Can. Broad. Corp. [CBC], Troubled Waters: Pollution in the Great Lakes, available at
http://archives.cbc.ca/IDD-1-75-1390/sciencetechnology/great lakes_pollution/ (last
visited June 10, 2007) (hereinafter Troubled Waters) (noting the very slow process to
increase the quality of the Great Lakes water); accord Billups et al., supra note 4, at 263
(declaring that people and wildlife cannot safely use the Great Lakes water because
damage in the sediments results in "fish and wildlife consumption advisories, fish tumors,
... and bird deformities").
6 See Troubled Waters, supra note 5 (stating that with scientists and environmentalists
monitoring progress, the Great Lakes are less polluted today than when the public outcry
first began).
7 See generally LEE BoTrs & PAUL MULDOON, EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER
QUALITY AGREEMENT (Michigan State Univ. Press 2005) (providing the history of the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement ("GLWQA") as it progressed through time, noting
the long history of cooperation between the United States and Canada).
8 See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that the increased focus and
monitoring of the Great Lakes is an improvement but that much more can be done); Int'l
Joint Comm'n [IJC], Advice to Governments on their Review of the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement: A Special Report to the Governments of Canada and the United
States 6 (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.ijc.org/rel/pdf/advicefinalwc.pdf (last
visited June 27, 2007) (hereinafter Advice to Governments) (explaining original concern
of high phosphorus levels have decreased as phosphorus concentrations are now constant
in four of the Lakes but continue to fluctuate in Lake Erie); Billups et al., supra note 4, at
276 (finding that Lake Erie's phosphorus loads dropped sixty percent since the late
1960s). Toxic substances continue to contaminate the Great Lakes, injuring fish, wildlife,
and humans. Id. at 289-90.
9See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasizing that the future of the Great
Lakes is "uncertain" and parties actions must increase quickly to restore, maintain, and
preserve the Great Lakes water quality); See also Troubled Waters, supra note 5 (stating
that scientists and environmentalists are monitoring issues concerning the Great Lakes);
cf Int'l Joint Comm'n [IJC], 12th Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality
(September 2004), available at
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Citizens of the Great Lakes Region, and increasingly U.S. citizens at large,
remain concerned with these issues.' 0
The United States and Canada began working together to maintain
the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the Great
Lakes Basin Ecosystem"" through a series of Agreements. In 1972, the
two countries created the original Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
("GLWQA") as an attempt to resolve all of the present and potential future
problems and disputes of the Great Lakes Re ion.12 However, the
countries need to address the GLWQA's pitfalls.' As the International
Joint Commission ("IJC") and the governments work together to review
the GLWQA, it is desirable to modify the language of the GLWQA to put
more accountability and enforcement mechanisms in place. 14
This Comment explores the failures of the GLWQA. Part I
discusses the history of the GLWQAs and the pressures resulting in
modifications to the GLWQA.15 Part II analyzes the problems facing the
http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/12br/english/report/ (last visited June 1, 2007)
(hereinafter 12th Biennial Report) (noting that despite the new issues arising, the
understanding of these issues, including climate change, is improving and toxic levels are
decreasing within the Great Lakes Region).
10 See Int'l Joint Comm'n [IJC], What is the Boundary Waters Treaty? 5, available at
http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.html (last visited May 30, 2007) (citing citizens'
concerns including water quality, release of municipal sewage and animal wastes, water
quantity and climate change, aquatic invasive species, and watershed management
issues).
1 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T.
301; Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T.
1384, available at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/glwqa/1978/index.html; 1384; Protocol
Between the United States of America and Canada, Amending the Agreement of
November 22, 1978, U.S.-Can., Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11551 (hereinafter
GLWQA), available at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/glwqa/1978/index.html. GLWQA].
12 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T.
301 (hereinafter GLWQA 1972) (stating the need for regular reviews to understand the
status of the Great Lakes and a need for efforts by the parties to improve the quality of
the region).
13 See infra notes 86-87.
14 See Michael J. Donahue, The Case for Good Government: Why a Comprehensive
Review of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement is Needed, 1999 TOL. J. GREAT
LAKEs' L. SCI. & POL'Y 1, 10-11 (1999) (asserting that a review is the only way to ensure
that parties meet their responsibilities); see also infra Part III.A-B.
" See infra Part I.
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GLWQA today, including the lack of accountability and enforcement
mechanisms within the text of the GLWQA.1 6 Lastly, Part III argues that
adding accountability and enforcement mechanisms to the text, while
simultaneously increasing public participation, will help ensure the
preservation of one of the great wonders of the world.17
I. BACKGROUND
Before disputes concerning water quality, use, and ownership rose
to a problematic level, the United States and Canada began working
together regarding the waters that flow between the two countries.' 8 Early
in the twentieth century, the countries' primary goal was ensuring their
full access to the waters that stretched across a large portion of the
boundary between them.19 As time progressed and humans began an
extensive use and abuse of the waters the countries' needs changed and
they focused on working cooperatively to restore and maintain the quality
of the Great Lakes.20
A. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909: A First Effort at Regulating
the Boundary and Transboundary Waters
In 1909, the governments of the United States and Great Britain
(on behalf of Canada) enacted the Boundary Waters Treaty ("BWT").2 1
The BWT is a contract between the United States and Canada governing
the use of boundary and transboundary waters. 22 The purpose of the BWT
is to offer guidance to the countries and serve as a source to help resolve
1' See infra Part II.
7 See infra Part III.
18 Cf Leonard B. Dworsky, Albert E. Utton & David J. Allee, The Great Lakes:
Transboundary Issues for the Mid-90s, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 347, 349-50 (1995) (detailing
the history of the Boundary Waters Treaty ("BWT") including its use to "prevent and
resolve disputes") (internal citations omitted).
19 See infra note 24.
2o See infra Part I.B-D.
21 Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit. (for Can.), Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448
(hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty).
22 See BoTrs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 9 (reinforcing that the BWT governs the
world's largest freshwater ecosystem).
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disputes over the water quantity and water quality. 23 At its core, the BWT
controls the allotment of the water and declares that the water between the
24
countries is a shared source. Today, the BWT remains the key contract
regarding the Great Lakes. 25
Within this BWT, the parties created the IJC, designed to examine
and report on issues over the waters between the United States and
Canada.26 Although according to the terms of the BWT the IJC is an
investigative and adjudicative body, in actuality its adjudicative powers
are extremely small. The functions of the IJC include: (1) quasi judicial
power, which applies to the governing principles of the water use
23 See What is the Boundary Waters Treaty?, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that the parties
created the BWT to oversee all present and future disputes that could arise over the
boundary between the United States and Canada).
24 See Christina D. Arvin, Virtual Elimination of Dioxin: Efforts of the United States and
Canada to Eliminate Dioxin Pollution as Required by the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 131, 132-33 (1996) (stating that early on,
feared disputes about ownership were the main concerns with the Great Lakes, not
pollution); Sean P. Gallagher, Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative: National Standards
Governing a Binational Resource: A Call for International Rulemaking, 2 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 466-67 (1994-1995) (proposing that the purpose of BWT was
to secure navigation rights and protect against water diversions).
25 See BoTTs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 9 (explaining that the BWT developed when
the countries wanted a binational institution, more permanent than the 1905 International
Waterways Commission).
26 See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 21, art. III (declaring that parties established
the International Joint Commission ("IJC") to give complainants a "convenient
opportunity to be heard" regarding issues concerning the boundary and transboundary
waters); Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 25 (explaining the IJC operates as a
binational-involving both nations-instead of a bilateral-representing your own
sides-organization). Six individuals are on the IJC at a time, three from each country,
despite the large difference in population between the two countries. See Boundary
Waters Treaty, supra note 21, art. III.
27 See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 21, art. VIII ("This International Joint
Commission shall have jurisdiction over and shall pass upon all cases involving the use
or obstruction or diversion of the waters . . . ."); see also Noah D. Hall, Implementing
Environmental Legislation: The Critical Role ofEnforcement and Compliance: The
Evolving Role of Citizens in United States-Canadian International Environmental Law
Compliance, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 139-40 (2007) (explaining that to submit to
the IJC's adjudicative power, both countries, even the country alleging a violation, must
have a two-thirds majority within their national government to agree to the IJC's
arbitration).
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(obstruction and diversion), (2) reference power-investigatory and
advisory, and (3) arbitral power, to resolve disputes under Article X.28
Since the IJC is structured to hear and accommodate the needs of both
countries, parity and equality are the main operating principles of the
IJC.29
B. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972: A Joint
Attempt at Controlling Pollution
Following World War II, a tremendous surge in public and
scientific concern arose about the pollution problems within the Great
Lakes Region. 30 By 1964, the issues had become so important that both
countries requested that the IJC conduct a study to examine the pollution
problems.31 In response to the study, the United States and Canada worked
towards negotiating an agreement to monitor and limit pollution within the
Great Lakes Region. 32 The BWT provided the "legal and institutional
foundation" for the GLWQA.33 The 1972 Agreement was the first
28 See Arvin, supra note 24, at 134 (stating that the IJC has never used their Article X
power because one of the IJC's strengths is avoiding disputes); Gallagher, supra note 24,
at 467; Lynton K. Caldwell, Emerging Boundary Environmental Challenges and
Institutional Issues: Canada and the United States, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 9, 20 (1993).29 See BoTTs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 11-12 (discussing the five operating
principles of the IJC including: (1) maintain parity and equality, (2) work with
binationalism, (3) depend on fact-finding to resolve issues, (4) separation from other
interested parties, and (5) individual representatives must act with their own expertise,
instead of as a representative of a group or government).
30 See id. at 13 (explaining that this surge in concern led both the U.S. and Canadian
governments to negotiate a bilateral agreement).
31 See Gallagher, supra note 24, at 467 (reporting very disturbing results, including the
discoveries that Lake Erie was a "dead lake" and that high levels of phosphorus were
causing eutrophication).
32 See id.; Media Release, Int'l Joint Comm'n [IJC], IJC Recommends a New Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement for the 21st Century (Oct. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.ijc.org/en/home/main accueil.htm (stating that Right Honourable Pierre
Elliot Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada and Richard Nixon, President of the United
States negotiated and signed the GLWQA).
3 See BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 7 (observing that the BWT created the IJC,
forcing Canada to overcome their fear of domination, and the United States to realize
cooperation is vital).
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international agreement to "restore and protect a large ecosystem across an
international border." 34
1. The Status and Purpose of the GLWQA
The United States and Canada created the GLWQA because of
concern over water pollution into a source of water the public used for
drinking and recreation, among many other things. 35 The GLWQA aims to
stop pollution that may result from human activities such as population
growth, resource development, and the increased use of the water for
survival, sanitization, and recreation.36 The GLWQA, a bilateral
"executive agreement," has a very ambiguous status.37 Due to the
GLWQA's ambiguity, some, including the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), argue that the GLWQA must be integrated with the
domestic law of each respective nation, because it is not enforceable by
itself.38
2. Parts of the GLWQA
The GLWQA is composed of two parts, the GLWQA itself and
34 See id. at 2 (citing LEE BOTTS AND BRUCE KRUSHELNICKI, THE GREAT LAKES: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS AND RESOURCE BOOK (Great Lakes National Program Office,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 3d ed. 1995)).
1 Cf id. at 14-15 (finding an increase in public demand resulted with the IJC conducting
a review that estimated cleanup efforts would cost the United States $1.3 billion and
Canada $211 million).
36 See generally Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 11, 23 U.S.T. at
annexes 1-17 (condemning several actions that pollute or damage the Great Lakes region
such as discharges of oil, onshore, and offshore facilities, and damages from dredging,
among many other actions taken by citizens of the countries).
37 See BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 15 (explaining that the heads of each country
sign an executive agreement but the agreement is not required to go through the
traditional process where Congress and Parliament ratify the agreement).
3 See id. at 15, 17 (noting that due to the GLWQA's status either country may terminate
the GLWQA with a one-year notice, making the GLWQA unenforceable in the long run);
cf Arvin, supra note 24, at 137 (explaining argument between Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), who argue that the GLWQA is not binding and others, who argue the
GLWQA is binding as an international treaty).
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several annexes. 39  The GLWQA lays out specific and general
objectives. 40 The text requires the countries to use their "best efforts" to
implement the objectives.4' One Annex in particular, addresses high
phosphorus levels in the water, an immediate concern.42 The remaining
Annexes of the GLWQA list target levels, which must be achieved using
joint efforts, for other toxins and describe the functions of programs and
IJC created Boards.43
3. Roles of the International Joint Commission, States, Provinces, and
the Public
The parties to the GLWQA conferred the same powers to the IJC
under the GLWQA as it did under the BWT.44 The IJC has the
responsibility to collect, analyze, and disseminate information and data
concerning the Great Lakes Region and pollution levels.45 Further, the IJC
can give recommendations, and investigate current issues or potential
46issues but they have severely limited adjudicative enforcement powers.
39 See Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 11 (composing of "narrative"
descriptions in the articles and a "list specific objectives" in the annexes).
40 See Gallagher, supra note 24, at 468 (noting that the specific objectives "incorporate
both narrative and numerical standards for individual pollutants").
41 See generally Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 11, at art. IV
(requiring only that the parties attempt to achieve the specific and general objectives by
putting forth maximum efforts, but the GLWQA does not state that the parties "must"
achieve the results).
42 See id. annex 2 (providing detailed information on phosphorus levels and
recommending the creation of programs to control phosphorus from (1) municipal
sewage, (2) industrial discharges, and (3) those attributable to animal husbandry); see
also Gallagher, supra note 24, at 468 (noting that phosphorus is among other pollutants in
sewage).
43 Cf Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 11, at annex 1 (citing toxins
such as chemical pesticides and metals, dissolved oxygen, oil, and many more
substances).
4 See id. art. VI (conveying powers under Article VI of the GLWQA).
45 See id. art. VII (granting the same powers of the IJC under the BWT).
46 See Christina D. Arvin, supra note 24, at 135 (listing new powers the IJC received
under the GLWQA including analyzing information concerning water quality, evaluating
program effectiveness, giving recommendations, and establishing Boards); see also Noah
D. Hall, supra note 27, at 140 (noting for example, "[fJor a dispute to be submitted to the
280
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The IJC offers advice on problems or potential problems if the need
arises.4 7 Under the GLWQA, the IJC set up two boards, the Water Quality
Board and a Research Advisory Board.48 Although the parties created the
Boards to help with the success of the GLWQA, "[t]he relative functions
of the [Boards] are somewhat uncertain." 4 9
Under the GLWQA, states and provinces have different roles.50
States are responsible to the federal government and federal policy since
they did not sign onto the GLWQA individually.5' The states' role in
implementing the GLWQA is therefore ambiguous and contradictory. 52
Canada's provinces have a much larger role than the states because
provinces have the "implementation power through legislation and
program control rather than the federal government." 3 Since the parties
enacted the GLWQA in the 1970s, citizen participation in the monitoring
and implementation of international environmental agreements has
expanded. 54 Public participation plays a large role in the effectiveness of
International Joint Commission for a binding arbitral decision, a reference is required by
both countries.... [t]he consent of the U.S. Senate is required for such action.") (internal
citations omitted); Lloyd J. Spivak, Comment, Structural and Functional Models for the
Proposed North American Commission on the Environment, 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
901 (1993) (reporting that governments have not used the arbitrary powers of the IJC,
which require both parties to consent to arbitration).
47 See Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 11, art. VII (requiring the IJC to
report the GLWQA's progress biennially).
48 See BoTrs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 18 (stating that the Boards, like the IJC, must
act in their "expert capacity, rather than as representatives of their respective
governments").
See id. at 37 (noting that the Boards are ongoing and serve as references).
50 See infra notes.
51 See Borrs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 31-32.
52 See id. (explaining that states' satisfaction with the GLWQA is based on the level of
federal funding that they receive to implement such programs). Originally states would
only match federal funding to GLWQA programs. Id.
5 See id. at 32 (stating that because only the federal government, not states or provinces,
can negotiate international agreements, this lead to the formation of many bilateral
federal-provincial agreements in Canada, such as the development of the Canada-Ontario
Agreement in 1971).
54 See generally Hall, supra note 27 (declaring that citizen participation is now integral
into the success of the binational environmental legal regime today because of the
public's expanded role in the enactment of agreements in the last few decades).
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the GLWQA.ss
C. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978: More than
Control-Virtual Elimination of Pollution
In 1978, the parties modified the GLWQA and it became known as
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978.56 The main difference
between the original GLWQA and the 1978 revision is that the first
GLWQA5 7 focused on improving the water quality through "pollution
control," whereas the revision adopted a broader approach by taking into
account the entire Great Lakes Ecosystem and aimed at the "virtual
elimination" of toxic pollutants.5 8 Although the original GLWQA focused
on phosphorous levels, the first revision was more evolved and addressed
other environmental problems. 59
ss See Mimi Larsen Becker, The International Joint Commission and Public
Participation: Past Experiences, Present Challenges, Future Tasks. (The North American
Experience Managing International Transboundary Water Resources: The International
Joint Commission and International Boundary and Water Commission, Part 2), 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 237, 241 (1993) (noting that public participation contributes to the
GLWQA's success by passing information, providing intelligence, encouraging
binational cooperation for common problems, and ensuring implementation at "alljurisdictional levels"); cf Right Honorable Herb Gray, Proceedings of the Canada-
United States Law Institute Conference on Understanding Each Other Across the Largest
Underfended Border in History, 31 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 287, 299 (noting that the success of
international agreements depends on not only all levels of government working together
but also "vigilance" by the public).
56 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T.
1384; see Gallagher, supra note 24, at 483 (asserting the revision was the first
international agreement to look at an entire ecosystem and requires the governments to
work together).
5 When referring to the "GLWQA" in the remaining portions of the Comment it is a
reference to the original GLWQA and all subsequent modifications.
58 See BoTrs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 51 (citing that the goal of the renegotiation
was to look at the implementation and effectiveness of the GLWQA); see also Gallagher,
supra note 24, at 469-70 (noting that the parties revised the GLWQA in response to the
increasing toxic chemical problems). The GLWQA encouraged the countries to develop
programs to minimize or eliminate substances from the region. Id.
See generally Borrs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 52-57 (acknowledging the evolved
scientific research in the area and the greater understanding of pollutants).
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D. The Protocol of 1987, Amending the GLWQA: Continued
Expansion and Protection
During the 1980s there was a change in the general approach taken
by the United States and Canada in their environmental practices. 60 The
parties modified the revised GLWQA again in 1987, nearly ten years after
the previous negotiations, forming the 1987 Protocol ("Protocol") between
the United States and Canada. 6 1 The Protocol included the development of
two new programs: Remedial Action Plans ("RAPs") and Lakewide
Management Plans ("LaMPs").62 Another major change involved a
shifting of the power and responsibilities from the IJC to the governments
63
of the GLWQA. A major goal of the Protocol and reason for updating
the GLWQA was to increase government accountability. 6
Even though the parties have not modified the GLWQA itself in
over twenty years, the Great Lakes Regime is constantly evolving. New
problems are arising in the region including the arrival of invasive species
60 See id. at 51-52 (noting that a shift in the 1980s resulted in a focus on pollution
prevention rather than pollution control).
6 Protocol Between the United States of America and Canada, Amending the Agreement
of November 22, 1978, U.S.-Can., Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11551 (hereinafter
GLWQA 1987). Protocols focus on specific issues and allow more groups to participate.
See Jutta Brunnee and Stehen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 57 (1997).
62 See, e.g., GLWQA 1987, supra note 61, annex 1 (declaring that Remedial Action Plans
("RAPs") restore and protect Areas of Concerns and Lakewide Management Plans
("LaMPs") are programs developed to restore and protect "open lake waters"); Gallagher,
supra note 24, at 471 (explaining that the RAPs are programs aimed at extremely
polluted areas that require immediate action); Becker, supra note 55, at 253 (explaining
that RAPs are in place to restore the Areas of Concern, and rely, to a great extent, on
public participation).
63 See BoTTs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 103 (stating that the goal was to encourage
more direct communication between the governments which would save travel time and
money); Gallagher, supra note 24, at 471-72, 474 (noting that the shift in power, from the
IJC to the parties directly, makes the parties responsible for the coordination of the
GLWQA itself and for meeting at least twice a year).
6 See Billups et al., supra note 4, at 280 (asserting that accountability in the Protocol
should increase by "regular government reporting to the IJC and the public" and that the
governments need to submit a "report card" every second year); see also Donahue, supra
note 14, at 5 (noting that the IJC's role, in coordinating, assessing, and monitoring
progress, has decreased).
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and global warming, which affect the lives of citizens. 5 Each country also
has taken different approaches to the management of the environment.66
The United States has evolved even further from pollution prevention to
the new policy of the "preservation of biodiversity and restoration of
habitat."67 Congress passed new legislation in 2003 that ignores the terms
of the GLWQA.68 Canada focused on the "virtual elimination" of
pollution, but when funding became limited, the Canadian government
downsized programs. 6 9 Since downsizing program expenditures, Canada
has struggled, particularly in the 1990s, to maintain its existing
environmental laws. 70 Governments taking individual approaches call the
GLWQA into doubt for the first time since its enactment in 1972. ' The
future will tell whether the GLWQA will withstand a changing physical
and political environment.
The governments are currently undergoing a review of the
GLWQA and before beginning the review the IJC collected public input
65 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 6 (discussing new chemical issues (input
of polybrominated diphenyle ethers), biological issues (invasive species), climate change,
air pollution, shoreline development, and urban sprawl, which cause problems for lake
species and humans alike including bans on swimming beaches); cf BOUrS & MULDOON,
supra note 7, at 89 (asserting that the old problem of toxic contaminates, including a
surge in phosphorus levels, remains a "major issue").
66 See BOTrs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 28 (stating that both governments enacted
environmental laws and the U.S. EPA and Environment Canada created programs to
respond to the pollution issues).
67 See id. at 91-92 (explaining that the 1990 Clean Air Act and the EPA now have control
over many aspects of the GLWQA, and the EPA is encouraging "voluntary pollution
prevention by major industries").
See id. at 137 (stating that the new legislation grants the Great Lakes states control over
new federal funding). The states did not sign the GLWQA and therefore, are not required
to use the funding to advance the goals of the GLWQA. Id.6 9 See id. at 94-97 (noting Canada announced the Green Plan in 1990 in response to the
argument made by activists that current programs were not effective enough). Ultimately,
the Green Plan was unsuccessful because of a deficiency in funds. Id.70 See, e.g., id. (discussing Canada's numerous environmental laws, many aimed at the
Great Lakes, that face problems due to a lack of funding).
71 See, e.g., id. at 137 (explaining that Congress passed new legislation regarding
prevention of pollution into the Great Lakes region without the consent of Canada or the
IJC).
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on the status of the Great Lakes Ecosystem and the GLWQA.72 The lJC
has issued advice to the governments, advising them to replace the
GLWQA with a new, more action oriented agreement.7 3 Finding solutions
to the Great Lakes issues is becoming increasingly important because a
problem in the Great Lakes "is nearly always a global problem." 74
II. ANALYSIS:
"With the environmental concerns rising to the forefront of [United
States and Canada's] agendas, it is urgent that both countries consider how
to strengthen the [GLWQA] and expand their mutual cooperation in
controlling pollution in the Great Lakes."7 Binational cooperation is
critical to the success of the GLWQA because "contamination does not
recognize international borders." Since the enactment of the GLWQA,
pollution into the Great Lakes has decreased tremendously but the parties
72 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 1 (noting the parties' review started in
April 2006); Int'l Joint Comm'n [IJC], Synthesis ofPublic Comment on the Forthcoming
Review by the Federal Governments of Canada and the United States of the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, at vii, available at
http://www.ijc.org/en/activities/consultations/glwqa/synth.php (last visited June 7, 2007)
(hereinafter Synthesis ofPublic Comment) (explaining that in 2005 both countries
requested that the IJC conduct public meetings across the region to educate the public and
to allow for public input before an official review began in early 2006).
7 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 1.
74 BoTrs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 3-4; accord Synthesis ofPublic Comment, supra
note 72, at 7.
"Only one ten-thousandths of planet Earth's water is fresh and available. Water
is part of the 'Global Commons': which we share with all the world's people
and life forms. The Great Lakes represent 18 to 20 percent of that very scarce
resource. We have a huge global responsibility to protect the 10,000 year-old,
life-sustaining gift from the last ice age. Freshwater scarcity is so severe it ranks
second only to climate change as the most pressing global environmental issue
today."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
7 Weiss, supra note 3, at 385-86.
76 Gallagher, supra note 24, at 483 (citing Water Quality Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works Transportation,
101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 12-13, at 6 (1990) (statement of Gordon K. Durnil, Chairman, U.S.
Section, International Joint Commission)); accord Caldwell, supra note 28, at 17 (noting
that the goals of the GLWQA can only be achieved through extensive coordination).
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have not reached many of the requirements or goals of the GLWQA.n
The parties have not changed or modified the GLWQA since 1987, even
though the GLWQA requires updates and reports on the quality of the
lakes and progress made by the parties.
Problems exist because the GLWQA lacks both accountability79
and enforcement8 0 mechanisms. Without accountability mechanisms,
governments do not know nor need to take control of different
" See Billups et al., supra note 4, at 248, 254-55 (finding governments have not (1)
worked with the IJC and listened to suggestions on many matters, (2) succeeded at
eliminating any critical pollutants, (3) set timetables, or (4) completely resolved the
eutrophication problem in harbors, rivers and streams, among many other things); Neil S.
Kagan, Great Lakes Commentary: Building on the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement: The Next 25 Years, 1998 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L. SCI. & POL'Y 37, 38
(1998) (noting that "progress has stalled" in the Great Lakes region since the mid-1980s);
Oran R. Young, North American Resource Regimes: Institutionalized Cooperation in
Canadian-American Relations, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 47, 51 (1998)
(explaining that there are many positive results of the GLWQA including serving as a
model to other parts of the world, contributing to the increased understanding of the
ecosystems in question, and encouraging regulations that lead to improvements in the
quality of the lakes). However, Young notes that not all efforts to resolve disputes
concerning the shared natural resources and environment between Canada and the United
States have been successful. Id. Among other problems, Young discusses the issues of
lack of resources and the weakening of the GLWQA due to changes in the administrative
provisions made by the 1987 Protocol. Id.
See Billups et al., supra note 4, at 250 (implying that the governments of the United
States and Canada have not met the communication expectations of the public including
consulting with the public on matters such as the development and implementation of
LaMPs); See also infra notes 116-117 (explaining parties have not reported as required);
cf BOTTS & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 211 (providing a list of challenges facing the
Great Lakes regime: (1) low levels of political commitment and resources, (2) decreased
political power of the communities surrounding the Great Lakes, (3) lack of
implementation, (4) new dangers, (5) low levels of funding for research and science, (6)
the changing power from the IJC to the governments, and (7) failure of the parties to
communicate with other international organizations).
79 See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 2 (suggesting that the governments of the
binational GLWQA apply an extremely strong Accountability Framework to increase the
accountability of the countries under the GLWQA).
80 Cf Hall, supra note 27, at 159 (arguing that the United States is highly unlikely to
enter into a binding international agreement that would force it or its industries to comply
with international adjudication in regards to environmental regulations).
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responsibilities in the GLWQA." Without enforcement mechanisms,
governments do not follow through with commitments they made that are
good for the world at large. 2 Although the GLWQA has been
successful, 83 the serious past and future problems with the Great Lakes
Basin Ecosystem have not disappeared and "[we] should never take
success for granted in efforts to institutionalize cooperation at the
international level," 84 because "even the most successful arrangements ...
are not immune to pitfalls that could lead to serious problems in the future
,,85
A. The GLWQA Lacks Substantial Accountability: Parties and
Citizens do not know what Actions They or Others
are Responsible for
Accountability in treaties and agreements is critical to their success
and the GLWQA lacks sufficient accountability mechanisms.86 In the past,
the minimal accountability in the GLWQA, such as requiring the parties to
provide special reports, greatly increased the development and awareness
of a large binational community, but these same mechanisms have not
8 See infra Part II.A.
82See infra Part I.B.
83 See Donahue, supra note 14, at 1 (contending that GLWQA made substantial progress,
despite citizens and organizations argument that progress was inefficient).
8 Young, supra note 77, at 68 (noting variation in the success of international
environmental agreements, even when they involve the same two parties).
8 1 d. at 57.
86 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the problems with the
GLWQA including outdated goals, redundancies and missing pieces, and a lack of
specific targets, responsibilities, and actions); Becker, supra note 55, at 268 (stating that
the IJC does not have the power to hold parties accountable and the parties are not
motivated to meet deadlines). But see BoTTs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 198 (noting
that accountability played a major role in the first twenty-five years of the GLWQA).
Acknowledging the importance of accountability, some analysts believe that the success
of the GLWQA is partially due to the accountability and openness built into the GLWQA
by the sharing of information among the parties. Id. The authors argue that there is
accountability in the GLWQA, citing provisions requiring periodic review, regular
progress reports, information be available to the public, and information be shared
between the parties and the IJC. Id. at 210.
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been as successful in the last few years.8 7 The GLWQA depends on the
parties knowing what results they are responsible for because
"[u]nambiguous accountability is central to the [GLWQA]'s success."
However, the GLWQA does not specify which party is responsible for
taking what actions in regards to several aspects of the GLWQA.89
1. The GLWQA does not specify Action Roles
Which level(s) of government, federal, state, provincial, or even
municipal, is accountable to the GLWQA is unknown, and confusing at
best.90 The lack of knowledge as to which government or level of
government is accountable for what actions is unsurprising, as the
GLWQA does not explicitly make certain levels of government
accountable. 91 While the GLWQA makes clear that the term "parties"
refers to both the United States and Canada, it does not further assign roles
to different levels of government within each country.92 At most, the
8 See BoTrs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 211 (asserting that the parties need to quickly
change the GLWQA before it becomes irrelevant to the preservation of the Great Lakes
and can no longer address existing and new challenges).
88 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that progress in protecting the Great
Lakes from old and new problems depends in large part on whether or not the many
different levels of government can work together and create solutions to hold each
accountable to the GLWQA).89 See id. at 8-9 (summarizing that the GLWQA only mentions the Coast Guards
specifically, while the rest of the GLWQA assumes that the federal governments will
work with the specified state and provincial governments to achieve the various
objectives); cf Synthesis ofPublic Comment, supra note 72, at 14 (finding that although
the there is debate about where the responsibility lies, most citizens believe the federal
governments have most of the exclusive accountability).
90 See Synthesis ofPublic Comment, supra note 72, at 14.
91 See GLWQA, supra note 11, arts. I-XV (conveying the sense that pollution controls is
a group effort but failing to state more specific accountability roles); Synthesis of Public
Comment, supra note 72, at 14 (quoting one university professor as saying, "local, state
and provincial governments have absolutely no accountability or governance mandate
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement").92 See GLWQA, supra note 11, art. I (stating that the term "State and Provincial
Governments" applies to state and provincial governments that border the Great Lakes
including Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Wisconsin,
Pennsylvania, and Ontario, but the text does not include a list of responsibilities of
individual actors or governments); See also Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 6
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GLWQA provides, "[t]he Parties, in cooperation with State and Provincial
Governments"93 or "Parties commit themselves to seek . . . the
cooperation of the State and Provincial Governments in all matters relating
to this [GLWQA]."94 In Annexes 1 and 2, the GLWQA does state that the
parties need to make sure that any state or provincial government involved
is consulted and that the public is consulted as well, but exactly who is
effected or who needs to consult the public is not outlined. 95
Without accountability, federal, state, provincial, and local
governments easily avoid including in their budgets the costs required to
decrease pollution and return the Great Lakes to their natural state. 96
Without knowing who has the responsibility to implement programs and
who has already implemented programs, the GLWQA cannot hold
individuals and parties accountable. 97 For example, Article IV of the
GLWQA lays out the specific objectives but does not explain which
governments are responsible for the objectives or how those responsible
should achieve the vague objectives. 98 Article VI states, "areas should be
identified by appropriate jurisdictions," but the appropriate jurisdictions
are unknown.9 Therefore, governments can pass the blame or
responsibility to someone else.' 0
(noting accountability for achievements under the GLWQA is not specified in the
GLWQA).
9 GLWQA, supra note 11, art. VI.
94 Id. art. XI.
95 See id. annexes 1-2 (discussing goals of specific and general objectives including RAPs
and LaMPs).
96 See infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
97 See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 7 (stating it is crucial to review the attempts
to achieve the results of the GLWQA and the means used to accomplish these objectives
in order to establish accountability).
98 See generally GLWQA, supra note 11, art. IV, annexes 1-17 (stating the specific
objectives include the parties, in cooperation with state and local governments and the
IJC, working towards the elimination of: (1) areas of concern, (2) critical pollutants, and
(3) point source impact zones). Other than setting certain substance levels that should not
be exceeded in the Great Lakes, the GLWQA contains little guidance on how to achieve
these levels. Id.
9 See id. art. VI; Caldwell, supra note 28, at 13 (finding that governments can avoid
responsibility because there is no unified jurisdiction that has control).
00 See Dworsky et al., supra note 18, at 351 (charging that national governments fail to
implement programs and instead pass responsibility to state, provincial, and local
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2. The GLWQA's Standards are Unclear and Outdated
In addition to the uncertainty of responsibility, the GLWQA lacks
clarity on what needs to be accomplished or by when.' 0' Under the
GLWQA the parties agreed to use "maximum effort," 02 "all reasonable
and practicable measures," 03 and their "best efforts" to fulfill the purpose
of the GLWQA,1 04 but the GLWQA does not require the parties to go any
further or define the meaning of these terms. s There are some target
levels for the parties to reach concerning several substances, requirements
that the parties meet with each other, 0 and a general framework for the
parties to follow, but there is a deficiency of specific requirements to
comply with the GLWQA.10 7 Article IV, Specific Objectives, provides
that parties should use the results of "statistical valid sampling data" to
determine the achievement levels of the objectives, an example of a broad
requirement that provides little direction to the parties. 08 Though the
governments); cf Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 13 (arguing that because the
GLWQA does not include specific provisions for the problems associated with human
health, government departments do not feel accountable and do not address the issues in
their research efforts).
10' See infra Part II.A.2.
102 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 11, art. II (explaining that the
parties understand they must use "maximum effort" to better appreciate the Great Lakes
Basin Ecosystem and with this knowledge they must eliminate or substantially reduce
pollutants into the Great Lakes to the best of their ability).
103 Id. art. IV (mandating parties to use measures not listed in the GLWQA as well as
those agreed to under Specific Objectives).
104Id. art. V (urging countries to ensure that state and provincial governments' goals are
consistent with the GLWQA).
105 See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 8; Arvin, supra note 24, at 183 (analyzing
argument that the GLWQA sets "objectives and goals" but does not set binding
standards). But see GLWQA, supra note 11, arts. IV, VI (calling for parties to keep the
boundary waters under review and develop new and additional treatments when present
treatment techniques are inadequate to meet the objectives); Further, the current
uidelines can be overridden by more "stringent" requirements. Cf id. art. IV.(107) See generally GLWQA, supra note 11, annexes 1, 3 (stating that parties must
consult with each other when establishing objectives, controlling substances, and keeping
the Great Lakes progress under review).
107 See generally id. annexes 1-17 (speculating target levels for toxins and other
substances).
108 See id. art. IV (explaining that the specific objectives of Annex 1 must be met).
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Annexes do provide some direction, they fail to address the other
accountability issue-who is in charge of the program.109
The GLWQA lacks any "rigorous" accountability plan.1 0 Further,
the objectives the GLWQA does contain are outdated and indefinite
because the GLWQA was last updated in 1987.111 One of the few dates
listed in the GLWQA and the most recent is September 30, 1989 where
parties were required to identify and report Point Source Impact Zones to
the IJC.112 The parties are not held accountable if the target dates are
outdated or missing.11 3 Again, the GLWQA does contain a few specific
requirements and programs but the goals are outdated.1 4 In theory, the
GLWQA achieves accountability by forcing the parties to report their
progress; however, the parties have not reported as required by the
109 See id. annexes 1-17 (addressing oil discharge from shipping vessels but failing to
address which level of government or which agency is in charge of monitoring oil
discharge).
110 See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 13 (offering suggestions for achieving
greater accountability and creating a rigorous accountability plan to improve the quality
of the Great Lakes).
"' See id at 8 (explaining that the GLWQA contains few limits, thresholds, or schedules
for action and that those included are outdated); see also Advice to Governments, supra
note 8, at 7 (clarifying that due to its outdated text, tables, and timelines, the GLWQA
does not address many of the new issues). But see GLWQA, supra note 11, art. VI, annex
1 (containing annexes that recognize the need for updates and changes). For example,
Article VI calls for additional treatment when the original treatment is ineffective, and
other areas of the GLWQA, such as annex 1, calls for updates when there are changes in
technology, thus urging the parties to adopt the best technology available. Id. art. VI,
annex 1.112 See GLWQA, supra note 11, annex 2 (discussing RAPs and LaMPs).
113 See id art. VI, annexes 1-2, 12, 14 (finding that some the last dates of required
compliance were (1) Sept. 30, 1989, (2) Dec. 31, 1988 when parties must compile a list
of three specific substance types, create programs for pollution from municipal sources,
must report progress of RAPs and LaMPs, report on progress of eliminating persistent
toxic substances, and meet certain requirements regarding contaminated sediment, (3)
Dec. 31, 1988 and Oct. 1, 1988 when the parties must perform certain actions in
connection with contaminated sediment and airborne toxic substances, (4) July 1, 1988
when the parties must consult on or before, (5) Apr. 1988 when the parties must make
certain determinations regarding substances, and (6) Dec. 31, 1983 when parties must
complete programs to stop pollution from industrial sources).
114 See id. arts. IV-VI (listing some requirements for the parties to achieve).
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GLWQA for several years."15 Not reporting can stop progress under the
GLWQA."
Another problem with accountability, which impedes
implementation, is a lack of accountability for obtaining financial
resources.1 17 The GLWQA does not dictate how much funding the parties
should allot nor how to ensure that there are funds, but the GLWQA does
state that financial assistance should come from several areas.118 Without
funding, nor putting accountability on parties to obtain funding, the parties
will not meet the objectives."19
The GLWQA states that the parties must strive to make the Great
Lakes free from substances that enter, materials that float in, materials that
heat, and nutrients that enter the water as a result of human activity.120
Further, the GLWQA states, "all reasonable and practicable measures
must be taken."'21 What are these measures? How far does the federal
government, the state government, the provincial government have to go?
115 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 6 (declaring that parties and the IJC did
not comply with reporting requirements articulated in the GLWQA, and the current
requirements do not lead to effective and meaningful reporting); Billups et al., supra note
4, at 256, 280-81 (finding that neither party has identified, delineated, and reported every
two years as required by Annex 2 of the GLWQA, and released reports lack detail, failing
to adequately report on unsuccessful programs). The governments often ignore the
reporting advice of the IJC, deciding to report less regularly than they have in the past,
and accountability did not increase under the Protocol as desired. Id. at 283.
116 See GLWQA, supra note 11, art. X (requiring parties to discuss recommendations that
stem from their reports with the IJC).11 7 See, e.g., Billups et al., supra note 4, at 283-286 (finding that funding for the GLWQA
has substantially increased since enactment but that the funding has decreased in recent
years, particularly in Canada); see also Young, supra note 77, at 51 (claiming a major
problem with the GLWQA is that it does not have resources to develop the RAPs and the
LaMPs).
118 See GLWQA, supra note 11, art. II (declaring that local, state, provincial, and federal
governments all need to contribute financial assistance to the GLWQA's objectives); cf
Billups et al., supra note 4, at 278-97 (articulating that federal governments cut their
budgets and pass responsibility onto states and provinces, who in turn cut their budgets
and pass costs on to municipal governments).
119 Cf Young, supra note 77, at 59-60 (stating that pollutions problems in the Great
Lakes become harder to solve when there is a high cost required to fix them).
120 See GLWQA, supra note 11, art. III (noting examples of substances that may
adversely affect the aquatic life or the water directly and thus its uses).
121 Id. art. IV.
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The answers to these questions are unclear. Words such as "best efforts"
and "effective measures," are vague and undefined, failing to provide
specific direction to the entities involved.122 The IJC, recognizing the
urgent need for accountability, chose to focus its last biennial report
entirely on the topic of accountability.123 Without accountability, the
GLWQA is likely to stay at a standstill 24 and the parties will not meet its
objectives and address the challenges facing the Great Lakes.125
B. The GLWQA Lacks Enforcement Mechanisms to Fully Achieve Its
Agreed Upon Goals
International environmental agreements between the United States
and Canada often fail to include enforcement mechanisms.126 The
GLWQA lacks international enforcement because the EPA and
Environment Canada have primary control of the execution of the
GLWQA.127 Further, enforcement becomes very difficult as the parties
increasingly take individualistic approaches to the problems of the Great
122 See id.; see also Billups et al., supra note 4, at 255 (questioning why the governments
have not set timetables and plans for achieving toxin elimination).
123 See generally 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 1-3 (arguing the need for an
increase in accountability).
124 Cf Billups et al., supra note 4, at 254 (doubting that the governments are willing to
make innovative changes to eliminate toxins and believing that the governments will
stick to the status quo, despite recommendations to do otherwise).
125 See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 8-11 (explaining that the parties have not
met pollution control levels, set up monitoring systems or the monitoring systems are
ineffective, or reported the results as required by the GLWQA); see also Posting of Emily
Green to http://www.webdialogues.net/cs/ijc-greatlakes-discussionsview/dm/1 137 (Dec.
2, 2005, 13:22 EST) (arguing that the success of the GLWQA depends on knowing its
oals and timelines).26 Compare Dworsky et al., supra note 18, at 348 (analyzing Great Lakes issues and
finding that the main issue concerning Canada-U.S. programs is a problem with program
implementation, therefore, the governments must follow institutional structures, for
example, enforcement standards, as originally agreed before the United States started
creating policies individually), with Hall, supra note 27, at 160 (asserting that the
inclusion of binding arbitration in the BWT is impressive because more recent
agreements by the parties are deficient in enforcement provisions).
127 See Hall, supra note 27, at 148 (comparing the control the government agencies have
to the UC's decreased power).
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Lakes.128
1. Parties Ignore and Fail to Complete the Objectives of the GLWQA
because there is no Enforcement
The objectives of the GLWQA are not being achieved, nor
enforced, leading to slow implementation of the GLWQA because of a
lack of enforcement mechanisms.129 Several areas in the GLWQA address
enforcement but enforcement mechanisms are missing.13 Article II
conveying the policy of the parties, states, "Coordinating planning
processes and best management practices [should] be developed and
implemented by the respective jurisdictions to ensure adequate control ...
.1 The GLWQA does not provide any more information, and without
knowing which jurisdiction is accountable, no jurisdiction has the ability
to enforce the provisions of the GLWQA, nor does the GLWQA give
128 See BoTTs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 135 (noting the United States is taking its
own direction in the Great Lakes region, ignoring the point of the GLWQA-binational
cooperation); cf Gallagher, supra note 24, at 477 (stating that the EPA failed to consult
with Canada or the IJC before making decisions that affected the Great Lakes, despite the
importance of binational cooperation on shared resources). Even though the decisions and
actions taken by the EPA under the U.S. Clean Air Act are positive and fair to those
affected, all were not included in the decision making process as agreed to under the
GLWQA. Id. There have been several attempts by Canada and the United States to
comply with the GLWQA and incorporate the GLWQA into domestic law. See generally
Arvin, supra note 24, at 147-161. Several inconsistencies between domestic law and the
GLWQA have occurred as the United States takes an individual approach to water
pollution. Gallagher, supra note 24, at 478-79.
See Weiss, supra note 3, at 375-76 (noting that having few disputes over the GLWQA
is fortunate because there are no settlement tools). Because executive agreements are not
binding domestically, difficulties arise for parties; see also parties. See Interview with
Jim Chandler, Legal Advisor, International Joint Commission (June 28, 2007). As a
practical matter, with time and financial constraints, domestic organizations attempting to
comply with the GLWQA, are forced to put the GLWQA's requirements, including
reporting requirements, on the backburner until they complete all tasks required under
federal law. Id. Because there is no domestic, legal requirement that progress reports be
produced, they rarely are produced. Id. Therefore, the tools that would help the public
hold governments accountable are not available. Id.
3 0 See infra notes 131-135.
131 GLWQA, supra note 11, art. II.
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enforcement powers to jurisdictions.132 The GLWQA comes close, but
falls short of creating enforcement mechanisms in other areas of the text as
well.133 Article IV limits the powers of the "responsible regulatory
agencies," but does not give regulatory power to an agency. 14 Article VI
actually states that programs must have "effective enforcement" but does
not give enforcement powers to organizations to achieve this goal.'3 5
Without enforcement mechanisms, the governments do not have to
comply with regulations.1 36 As discussed in Part II(A), the little
accountability built into the GLWQA, and the requirement to perform
reviews and report on the results of actions is not completed because there
are no enforcement mechanisms.' 37 The GLWQA relies on the reporting
of results and achievements, but neither country nor the IJC have fully
complied with this requirement.' 38 Currently, there is no mechanism other
than the countries "best efforts" and domestic power under domestic law
to ensure compliance with the GLWQA.1 39
2. The IJC Lacks Substantial Capacity to Enforce the GLWQA
The closest the GLWQA comes to having an enforcement
mechanism or body is the IJC and even the IJC falls short.140 Despite the
position of the IJC to have enforcement powers, in actuality the IJC has
132 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
133 See GLWQA, supra note 11, arts. IV, VI.
134 See id. art. IV (subjecting the Specific Objectives of Annex I to requirements
including adequate treatment).
131 See id. art. VI (listing programs and other measures).
13 6 See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 8 (doubting that new programs and progress
have eliminated discharges of pollution from municipal and industrial sources as required
by the GLWQA).
137 See GLWQA, supra note 11, art. X (stating parties must report on the effectiveness of
implemented programs).
138 See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that the parties have not
established effective monitoring systems).
139 See Caldwell, supra note 28, at 9-11 (observing that there is no enforcement authority
controlling the Great Lakes environmental issues, although environmental organizations
are pushing for new governance).
140 See infra Part II.B.2.
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none.141 Article VII allows the IJC to investigate and analyze information,
as well as compel the testimony of witnesses.142 However, reports by the
IJC that answer the parties' questions are "in no way to have the character
of an arbitral award."l 43 Therefore, even though the IJC gives their
opinion, parties are not required to follow the IJC's recommendations and
thus the IJC has no enforcement powers.'44 In recent years, reluctant
governments have further prevented the IJC from using its powers.14 5
"The IJC will only be as strong and as effective as the Canadian and U.S.
governments allow it to be."' 46 The GLWQA also fails to create judicial
enforcement powers in any other organization or government.147 Although
judicial enforcement "has been essential to the ultimate implementation of
141 See Frank Quinn, Commentary, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 363, 364 (1993) (arguing that
the revisions to the 1972 Agreement weakened the IJC's authority).142 See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 21, art. IX; GLWQA, supra note 11, art. VII
(providing that most of the IJC's responsibilities concern collecting, analyzing, and
offering advice).
143 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 21, art. IX (declaring that the IJC shall make
reports to both governments but the IJC cannot force either government to follow their
advice); accord Spivak, supra note 46, at 917 (noting that IJC does not have
implementation or enforcement powers).
144 See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 28, at 9 (accepting that the IJC does not have political
or enforcement powers, but may review and negotiate environmental issues). But cf
Stephen J. Toope and Jutta Brunnee, Freshwater Regimes: The Mandate of the
International Joint Commission, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 273, 276, 287 (1998)
(arguing that some reporters believe strengthening the IJC's enforcement powers is
unrealistic because it lacks any enforcement power and undesirable because it may
become less effective).
145 See Toope & Brunnee, supra note 144, at 275.
146 Gallagher, supra note 24, at 471-72 (noting a shift in responsibility for coordination of
the GLWQA, including a requirement to meet, from the IJC directly to the parties);
accord Toope and Brunnee, supra note 144, at 276 (arguing that both countries have
intentionally attempted to prevent the IJC from having any independent jurisdiction
although the countries claim to have committed themselves to the IJC). Enforcement
provisions are needed so groups or individuals can hold the governments accountable in
court. Id However, Toope and Brunnee believe that if the UC had more enforcement
powers, the parties may choose to resolve issues through the political process instead,
thereby decreasing the influence of the IJC. Id.
147 See GLWQA, supra note 11, arts. I-XV.
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many environmental laws and programs," 48 it has not played a large role
in the enforcement of the GLWQA.149 Relying on domestic courts is a
sign of inadequate international enforcement mechanisms.o50 However,
enforcement is left almost entirely to domestic law. 5'
3. Little Implementation Occurs Without Enforcement
Implementation of programs is critical to the GLWQA's
success. One of the goals of the GLWQA is "to improve management
processes for achieving [GLWQA] objectives and to demonstrate firm
148 See Green, supra note 5; cf. Hall, supra note 27, at 149 (arguing that the GLWQA
lacks a "legally enforceable status in domestic courts" even thought litigation is often the
only successful enforcement mechanism).
149 See Lake Erie Alliance for the Prot. of Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
526 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 (D. Pa. 1981) ( "([A]lthough) the agreement [GLWQA] does
not override federal law and is not legally binding within U.S. boundaries, it does
represent a commitment of the U.S. to fulfill its terms. Consequently, the GLWQA must
be considered in formulating federal policies and in making responsible decisions within
the federal government.") (citation omitted); See also Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115
F.3d 979, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (deciding that the GLWQA does not require the EPA to
explicitly state how they will accomplish virtual elimination because the GLWQA only
sets goals without mandating reporting). But cf Indiana Water Quality Coal. v. United
States Env't Prot. Agency, 2006 WL 467747 (Feb. 21, 2006) (acknowledging the Clean
Water Act has similar goals to the GLWQA); Gallagher, supra note 24, at 485 (equating
Great Lakes issues to the international air transportation issues in Pan American World
Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 517 F.2d 734, 736 (2d. Cir. 1975), where the Second
Circuit realized that foreign countries need to be included in decisions).
150 See Beth Stephens, Accountability for International Crimes: The Synergy Between the
International Criminal Court and Alternative Remedies, 21 WIs. INT'L L.J. 527, 527
(2003) (discussing that in other international contexts, large players such as the
International Criminal Court contribute to the success of treaties and hold actors
responsible for violations).
151 See GLWQA, supra note 11, art. XI (noting that parties might need to enact additional
legislation and work with state and provincial governments to carry out responsibilities
under the agreement).
152 See Billups et al., supra note 4, at 252 (recommending governments continue to follow
through with the agreements made under the GLWQA to develop and implement
programs, while realizing the programs need enforcement mechanisms). But cf Brunnee
and Toope, supra note 61, at 30-31 (arguing that society's push for increased
enforcement may not have the anticipated end result of achieving the GLWQA's goals).
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leadership in the implementation of control measures . . . ."' Article XI,
Implementation, covers the responsibilities of the parties including
seeking: (1) appropriation of funds, (2) the enactment of any needed
additional legislation, and (3) the cooperation of state and provincial
governments.154 The GLWQA provides no further enforcement advice or
guidance.15 5 The lack of implementation, partially caused by a lack of
enforcement, has several negative effects on GLWQA results.' 56
The GLWQA has a "sub-treaty status" which fails to have any
enforcement mechanisms, and thus impedes implementation. 157 Because
the GLWQA is an executive agreement, with a sub-treaty status, the
GLWQA is not binding under U.S. law because it did not have
Congressional approval and therefore, U.S. participants are not forced to
do their part.' 5 8 Most countries view international law as superseding
domestic law, however, the United States believes that international law
becomes part of the body of U.S. federal law and additional legislation can
change the international law.1 59 Also, without the threat of enforcement or
153 GLWQA, supra note 11.
154 See id. art. XI (noting that GLWQA requires funds to achieve end goals).
155 See id. art. XI.
156 Cf Billups et al., supra note 4, at 248 (finding that the governments still need to
accomplish many of the objectives, including the elimination of critical pollutants).157 See Hall, supra note 27, at 149 (finding that attempts to enforce the GLWQA in U.S.
courts have been largely unsuccessful); see also Posting of Frank Bevacqua to
http://www.webdialogues.net/cs/ijc-greatlakes-agenda/view/dail52?x-t-summary.view
(Dec. 1, 2005) (predicting that both an accountability framework and an effective
fovernance structure would reduce the problems associated with the lack of treaty status).
See Gallagher, supra note 24, at 478, n. 110 (citing Implementation of the United
States/Canada Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Investigation and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1987) at 13 (statement of Mark Van Putten, Director, Great
Lakes Natural Resources Center, National Wildlife Federation)) (claiming EPA officials
believe the "Agreement does not bind the EPA"); Hall, supra note 27, at 149. But see
Gallagher, supra note 24, at 478 (stating that Congress has declared the GLWQA binding
as federal law).
159 Cf Arvin, supra note 24, at 149 (finding that the Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative,
a domestic initiative, is the United States' first "significant step" towards implementing
the GLWQA and meeting its goals because it attempts to create uniformity in state laws
that touch or concern pollution in the Great Lakes region); Gallagher, supra note 24, at
465, n.30 (noting a growing concern that the United States is no longer following the
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enforcement mechanisms, government agencies do not provide the
necessary funding for implementation and programs.160
The GLWQA left the establishment of enforcement
mechanisms up to the parties. 161 Article VI, Programs and Other
Measures, discusses under each sub-topic that it is up to the parties to
establish effective enforcement programs to ensure full compliance with
the requirements of the GLWQA.' Parties have not set up enforcement
mechanisms because the GLWQA does not require them to do so.16 3
C. Case Study: Stopping the Invasion of Alien Invasive Species
The lack of accountability and enforcement mechanisms within the
GLWQA is demonstrated by the problem of an increasing number of alien
invasive species entering the Great Lakes.' A discovery of a new species
in the region occurs about once every six weeks.165 Some, including the
State of Michigan, are pushing to require all ocean-going ships to test their
ballast waters before entering the Great Lakes to ensure they that are not
bringing in new species.' 66 This raises many legal issues, including the
GLWQA as it creates laws that incorporate parts of the GLWQA but fail to fulfill all of
its responsibilities).
160 See Billups et al., supra note 4, at 268-69 (stating litigation is beneficial in that parties
can obtain needed funding but litigation is costly and time consuming).
161 See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
162 See GLWQA, supra note 11, art. VI.163 Cf id.
t6 Cf 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 1-3; Synthesis ofPublic Comment, supra
note 72, at 23-24 (noting that there is a problem of invasive aquatic species and the
current GLWQA does not provide coverage for dealing specifically with these species).
A clear solution to the alien invasive species problem is not easy to find because no one
is accountable, nor is the GLWQA set up in a way that the IJC or some other body can
hold violators responsible for contributing to the problem of introducing new species to
the Great Lakes. Id.
165 See, e.g., Dan Egan, Ban Ocean Vessels in Lakes? Some are Floating the Idea,
JOURNAL SENTINEL ONLINE (Apr. 21, 2007),
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=594384; cf 12th Biennial Report, supra
note 9, at vi (finding that ocean-going vessels introduce a new species to the Great Lakes
about once every eight months).
166 See Egan, supra note 165 (explaining that the goal is not to stop ocean-going traffic,
just to regulate the traffic).
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fact that individual states must coordinate with each other as well as with
Canada.16 7
The GLWQA's Annex 6 specifically addresses the review of
pollution from shipping sources. 6 8 The Annex states that there should be
a "review of practices and procedures regarding waste water and their
deleterious effect on water quality, including . . . studies to determine if
live fish or invertebrates in ballast water discharges into the Great Lakes
System constitute a threat to the System."l169 Although the GLWQA places
responsibility for the review of such activities on the Canadian and U.S.
Coast Guards, there are problems because the Coast Guards may need help
addressing and financing this task and again, there is no enforcement
mechanism.170 The IJC has recommended that the countries coordinate
with each other to take actions that will reduce, if not eliminate, the
continued contamination of the Great Lakes by alien species, but this has
yet to occur. 1 71 As species continue to enter the Great Lakes, it will
become impossible to return the ecosystem to one without human
interference.172
See id. (discussing both Michigan's attempt to take regulation of vessels into its own
hands and shippers' attempt to use the legal system to block the new laws which would
be very costly for shippers).
168 See GLWQA, supra note 11, annex 6 (noting that the Canadian and U.S. Coast Guards
should review services, systems, programs recommendations, and standards related to
shipping).
169 See id.170 See id; see also 12th Biennial Report, supra note 9, at 20 (noting that aquatic alien
species are providing a major challenge to the GLWQA and its institutional capacity). In
addition, the global nature of the shipping industry and the potential involvement of a
large number of agencies complicate the governments' responses. Id171 See 12th Biennial Report, supra note 9, at vi.172 See PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS 106-07 (Island Press 2006)
(explaining that exotic species are included in discussions about water diversion because
they substantially influence ecosystems, spreading rapidly when introduced into areas
without natural controls).
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
In the international effort to revise the GLWQA, the parties should
drastically change and update the text of the GLWQA.173 The parties need
to add both accountability and enforcement mechanisms so that the
GLWQA sufficiently protects the Great Lakes. 174 In addition, increasing
public participation is critical to the success of the Great Lakes Ecosystem
and the GLWQA.'17  Without the increased accountability, enforcement,
and public participation, the United States and Canada can disregard
responsibilities under the GLWQA and the world could lose an extremely
valuable resource.176
A. Increase Accountability to Increase Progress
The parties should address accountability in a very precise way.' 77
Federal governments should be accountable for directing all activity, since
the activity occurs, at a minimum, binationally.178 It then can be up to the
federal governments to delegate accountability and responsibility to the
states and provinces as they see fit.
It is critical to have goals, and therefore these goals should exist
within a strong accountability framework.179 "Successfully implemented,
173 See generally Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 3 (explaining parties are
currently performing a review, which began April 2006, as required after every third
biennial report).
174 See infra Part III.A-B.
171 See infra Part III.C.
176 Cf Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 5, 15-17 (explaining that some citizens
think the current GLWQA is enough but the IJC proposed an entirely new agreement).
Cf Borrs & MULDOON, supra note 7, at 137 (stating that the United States is already
beginning to take its own direction with environmental law).
177 Caldwell, supra note 28, at 13; see Synthesis ofPublic Comment, supra note 72, at 14
(advancing that the public wants accountability to be specifically placed on governments
or organizations).
178 Cf Hall, supra note 27, 158-159 (proposing public participation rather than legal
enforcement because public participation will increase accountability on the part of both
federal governments).
179 See 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 13-18 (arguing that a good accountability
framework starts by developing a rigorous plan, monitoring and assessing the plan,
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accountability focuses action on end goals and ensures that promises are
kept and commitments are honored. The best accountability frameworks
specify measurable results, the actions to be taken, by whom and by when,
how reporting back will occur and the consequences of inaction."1 80 In the
ongoing review of the Great Lakes, it is necessary for the GLWQA to
specify exactly who is responsible for the implementation of specific
goals. 181
To account for changing circumstances, the parties need to update
the goals periodically.' 82 IJC recommends a more drastic approach,
proposing the creation of an entirely new agreement that would more
easily allow for the updating of goals.' 83 The parties should base the goals
and timelines on the findings of the Great Lakes reports, which each party
must complete biennially using specific language. For example, possible
changes include: (1) allowing less of the toxic substances in the Annexes'
limits, (2) specifying the deadline for accomplishing these limits, (3)
stating what government or group needs to accomplish the task, and (4)
specifying the tasks that must be completed to lower the level of toxic
waste in the Great Lakes.184 The United States has often refused to
approve international treaties and agreements with strong accountability
factors but this may change.' 8 5 Increasing accountability, by making a
stronger framework, will help the IJC and others, including the public,
reporting, and then using the reports to review and adjust the plan); Weiss, supra note 3,
at 366-67 (declaring the need for more specific written standards and more deadlines).180 13th Biennial Report, supra note 3, at 7.
181 See id at 8 (arguing that it is important to make and update specific goals, objectives,
and timelines). But see Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 5 (acknowledging that
some, including the IJC at one time, believe that making drastic changes to the GLWQA
will only weaken commitments).
182 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at I (contending that replacing the GLWQA
with a more "action-oriented agreement" containing both goals and timelines is a solution
to the problems of the Great Lakes).
183 See id. at 15-19 (advancing the need for a new agreement that is more focused on
accountability, signed by the President and Prime Minister, endorsed by Congress and
Parliament, and containing a Binational Action Plan that can easily be modified and
ugdated).
See id. at 8 (encouraging the inclusion of reachable goals with realistic timelines for
completion in the IJC's proposed new agreement).
181 Cf Stephens, supra note 150, at 527 (noting that "the United States is fighting a losing
battle .... (and] will not be able to avoid accountability .... ).
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hold the governments and organizations accountable to the terms of the
GLWQA.'
B. Increase Enforcement Mechanisms to Increase Results
The more enforcement power backing the GLWQA, the more the
requirements will be met, and the more the world will reap the benefits of
the Great Lakes Region. In the review process, the parties should change
the text of the GLWQA to include enforcement mechanisms."' The
parties can do this by increasing the power of the IJC or by creating an
entirely new, third party adudicatory body, so that control of the Great
Lakes is more global.' Alternatively, the parties can increase
enforcement power of the GLWQA by bringing the GLWQA to the
attention of Parliament and Congress.' 89
The enforcement capabilities of the GLWQA will be increased if
the IJC has more reviewing and investigating power within the provisions
of the GLWQA.'90 This better enables the IJC to influence the parties as
they attempt to create legislation for the implementation of the
186 See Kagan, supra note 77, at 44 (declaring it is the IJC's responsibility to hold the
governments accountable and if parties provide more funding to the IJC, it will increase
the IJC's ability to give informed reports to the governments and public); cf Becker,
supra note 55, at 271 (arguing that increasing the public's ability to hold the parties
accountable is important in the revision of the GLWQA).
187 See infra Part III.B.
188 See GLWQA, supra note 11, art. 1I (assessing the need for the parties to use effected
jurisdictions to ensure control of pollutants). But see supra note 80 (arguing that the
United States will not enter into a binding agreement where it can be held accountable by
an international adjudicatory body).
189 See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
'
90 See Synthesis ofPublic Comment, supra note 72, at 14 (encouraging the review
process to insert provisions into the GLWQA that allow the IJC, state and provincial
governments, NGOs, and citizens of both countries the power to enforce the GLWQA);
Becker, supra note 55, at 267-68268 (arguing that a binational approach under the IJC is
not only essential but also more beneficial than separate approaches by each party or
jurisdiction). But see Toope & Brunnee, supra note 144, at 276 (arguing that changing
the enforcement powers of the IJC is not desirable because it is overly ambitious and thus
likely to lead to making the IJC ineffective).
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GLWQA.19 ' The IJC acting as an adjudicatory agency is even more
beneficial and forces both the United States and Canada to comply.1 92
However, it is unlikely at this time that the United States would enter into
a "binding international treaty that subjects it-or its industries-to
international adjudication to enforce environmental standards." 93
Additionally, as previously discussed both countries fought to prevent the
IJC from gaining any independent powers,' 94 and curtailed the powers the
IJC did have,' 95 and in recent years have actually put most of the
responsibilities in their own hands rather than in the IJC.196 Since the IJC
is unlikely to assume a role as an adjudicative body in the near future, the
parties should stop limiting the IJC's powers and allow the IJC to function
as a review and investigating board so that the GLWQA has some
enforcement capabilities.1 97 Further, the text should allow the IJC to assist
191 See GLWQA, supra note 11, art. XI, available at
http://www.ijc.org/en/activities/consultations/glwqa/agreement_2.php#art6.Xl.
192 See Gallagher, supra note 24, at 466446 (encouraging Congress to "use its delegation
power to establish international rulemaking power in the IJC"); cf Spivak, supra note 46,
at 917-18 (declaring that organizations with more legal powers than the IJC like the
European Community-a supranational organization which takes precedence over
members national law-may be more effective at protecting environmental interests).
193 Hall, supra note 27, at 159-60 (noting that people who do not want the GLWQA and
the IJC to have more enforcement powers argue that no change is needed because citizens
can sue companies and industries in federal court under domestic law rather than relying
on the federal government to make progress); Weiss, supra note 3, at 383382 (explaining
that although the United States does not like to submit to final arbitration, there is
evidence that this is changing). But see Hall, supra note 27, at 132 (noting that
governments may be wary of bringing claims against other governments for fear of
setting "undesirable precedents" or of retaliation).194 See supra Part II.B.2.
195 See Toope & Brunnee, supra note 144, at 276, 282, 287-280 (arguing that the IJC is
only as powerful as the countries decide it to be and that the IJC lacks independent
enforcement powers and should not be turned into an adjudicatory agency).
19 6 See Hall, supra note 27, at 148 (finding that there is no international control because
the GLWQA is in the hands of Environment Canada and the U.S. EPA); cf Advice to
Governments, supra note 8, at 1 (encouraging the establishment of a Steering Committee
involving heads of federal departments and agencies to help with implementation rather
than giving adjudicative power to the UC).
197 See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
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in mediation between the parties, jurisdictions, and stakeholders. 19 8
Although it would be beneficial to have the IJC or some other entity, serve
as a neutral, legal enforcement body to solve the disputes surrounding the
GLWQA, this is unlikely, therefore, it is better to increase the LJC's
reviewing and investigatory powers than do nothing at all.199
As the parties continue to attempt to solve the Great Lakes
problems through their domestic laws, the parties and the LJC should bring
the GLWQA to the attention of Congress and Parliament. 200 Congress and
Parliament, rather than smaller, less powerful NGO's, are in the best
position to ensure the completion of requirements. Again, a supranational
adjudicatory body, where citizens can bring claims against other countries,
is likely to be successful but unlikely to be agreed to by the parties.201
Therefore, a change in the text of the GLWQA must increase the
enforcement powers the IJC already has and the parties must bring the
GLWQA to the attention of Congress and Parliament.202
C. Public Support: A Partial Solution to Accountability and
Enforcement
Parties, groups, and individuals must increase public support.203
198 See Becker, supra note 55, at 271 (arguing that incorporating the public into the IJC's
existing structure will help increase the mediation powers of the IJC).
199 See Weiss, supra note 3, at 379 (encouraging dispute resolution systems to be put in
place before the number of disputes increase); Interview with Jim Chandler, supra note
129 (speculating that the UC is not in a position nor looking to be a court to the GLWQA,
but would rather continue focusing on its strengths, such as making recommendations to
the parties).
200 See Interview with Jim Chandler, supra note 129 (explaining that Congress has more
power than current international laws to ensure the enforcement of the GLWQA and it is
the IJC's hope that the adoption of a new agreement will give the GLWQA a higher
profile). Congress should endorse the new agreement and hold periodic oversight
hearings. Id. Congress and Parliament's endorsement of the proposed new agreement
facilities accountability, implementation, and cooperation. See Advice to Governments,
supra note 8, at 15.
201 See supra Part III.B.
202 See supra Part III.B. But see Hall, supra note 27, at 132, 159-60 (arguing that there are
other mechanisms that can ensure compliance other than legal enforcement).
203 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 6 (encouraging more public involvement
by allowing the public to become more involved in meaningful ways); Brunnee & Toope,
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Currently, public concerns are growing more diversified and there is
uncertainty as to whether the GLWQA will be able to address these
concerns. 04 The laws, regulations, and policies involving the Great Lakes
need to have more unity so that the public can use them to its
advantage.205
Public participation can help increase both accountability and
enforcement of the GLWQA. The GLWQA has not succeeded in holding
governments accountable to the public. 206 Public concern is beneficial for
accountability 207 because government accountability increases when
public participation increases. 208 Also, with a lack of traditional legal
court enforcement backing the GLWQA, strong citizen participation
encourages the governments of the countries to comply with the
regulations.209 If the public must enforce the GLWQA through domestic
law, the public must know of the existing laws. 21 0 Groups that oppose
relying on the federal governments to enforce the GLWQA argue that
citizens can bring claims in federal court without waiting for the federal
supra note 61, at 27 (declaring that it is individuals and communities that reap the
benefits of knowing their resources are safe, so governments should focus on the public).
See Becker, supra note 55, at 272 (arguing that the public needs to become more
effective); Caldwell, supra note 28, at 21.
205 See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 28, at 17-18 (discussing the publics' failure to use law,
regulations, and policies to its benefit, to influence enforcement, or to know if its interests
are protected because of a lack of unity in the available sources); cf Becker, supra note
55, at 257 (noting demand by citizens for the parties to turn the GLWQA into something
enforceable by law); Brunnee & Troope, supra note 61, at 28 (maintaining that continued
cooperation between different groups and the public could lead to binding legal norms).206 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 15 (arguing that the public cannot hold
the government accountable if they do not have the necessary information); see also
Billups et al., supra note 4, at 250-51 (finding that the U.S. government agreed to consult
with the public on LaMPs projects but has neither involved the public nor distributed
materials to the public).
207 See Becker, supra note 55,. at 238 (noting that public participation, particularly for
environmental policies, is critical for implementation and support of the public policies as
well as ensuring accountability).
208 See Hall, supra note 27, at 150.
209 See id. at 159 (debating whether judicial enforcement is the best compliance
mechanism in the realm of international law).210 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 19 (urging the parties to adopt a
"Binational Action Plan" that would explicitly state which federal, state, and provincial
laws, regulations, and programs to use in implementing the GLWQA).
306
GREAT LAKES WA TER QUALITY A GREEMENT
government; however, the GLWQA has not been successful in domestic
courts.211
It is up to the IJC to make sure that the public is fully involved
with discussions, aware of the parties' progress, and in a position to force
the parties to comply. 2 12 It is important that the public interact with the
government to help with the Great Lakes programs. 2 13 The IJC
recommends increasing public involvement as well.214 The GLWQA
should require the IJC to set up more forums and the parties to set up
domestic agencies, allowing the public to voice its concerns and help
make decisions on a continuous basis.2 15
It is up to the IJC and the countries to decide what the goals
need to be and what is important for the Great Lakes.216 However, without
specific references to who is accountable and who has the ability and
power to punish those that do not comply, the parties will not achieve
these objectives.217 Because it appears that the parties are not likely to
211 See Lake Erie Alliance for the Prot. of Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
526 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 (D. Pa. 1981); see also Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d
979, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that neither case was able to win on their GLWQA
claim, although the courts did recognize that industries and organizations must respect
and consider the GLWQA).
212See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 26 (deciding that as more industry and
environmental groups become involved in the Great Lakes it is the job of the IJC to
ensure that the groups have an ability to share information); Becker, supra note 55, at
242, 273 (recognizing the IJC's inclusion of the public, including public hearings, open
boards, IJC biennial meetings, and increased public education, will help solve the
problems of the Great Lakes); cf ANA BARREIRA, IMPLEMENTING TRANSBOUNDARY
RIVER CONVENTIONS: WITH EMPHASIS ON THE PORTUGUESE-SPANISH CASE:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 451, 452 (Luso-American Development Foundation
2003) (defining public participation as individuals and NGO's participating in the
decision-making process, noting that the public needs to have sufficient information).
213See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 6 (noting the separation between the
public and the GLWQA, including a lack of awareness).
214See id. at 2, 5, 6 (urging more public involvement in the Great Lakes Basin
Ecosystem).
215 Cf Becker, supra note 55, at 238 (noting major strategies to involve the public include
sharing information, giving citizens legal rights to sue, engaging citizens through
planning and mutual accountability, and using the public for "reactions"). The creation of
advisory boards for each lake is one way to ensure continued participation. Id.216 See GLWQA Agreement, supra note 11, arts. II, VII.217 See supra Part II.A-B.
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accept an international enforcement body at this time, it is critical to
increase public participation.2 18
CONCLUSION
The GLWQA has encouraged international cooperation and
greatly improved the quality of not only the Great Lakes Ecosystem, but
also other environmental ecosystems around the world. 2 19 Although the
GLWQA has been somewhat successful, countries need to preserve the
future of the environment and its people by working cooperatively and
creatively. Legally, this means ensuring that there are mechanisms in place
to enforce and comply with environmental legislation.
The GLWQA needs stronger mechanisms for both accountability
220and enforcement to achieve its objectives. Increasing public
participation is one way to ensure accountability by the parties and
enforcement of objectives. 22 1 The governments of the United States and
Canada, as well as the people, need to make continuous progress under the
GLWQA so that the next generations can eat the fish in the Great Lakes
and swim in its waters.
218 See Advice to Governments, supra note 8, at 5 (arguing that the GLWQA's plans
should include residents and the public, thereby enabling more involvement in the
restoration effort of the Great Lakes region).219 See Young, supra note 77, at 51 (finding that the GLWQA has encouraged regulations
that have increased the quality of the Great Lakes water and has served as a model for
other countries to follow).
220 See Green, supra note 125.
221 See supra Part III.C.
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